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Abstract
The Catholic encyclical document Fides et Ratio strongly supports
the link between faith and reason, and endorses the tradition of
using philosophy, with specific reference to metaphysics, to
express, develop and defend theological doctrines. In this paper I
will develop the implications of this document by referral to the
process philosophy of Whitehead and Hartshorne. I will elaborate
what I call ‘philosophy in context’, ‘context’ interpreted in two
distinct but related meanings: first, as the concreteness of life as
providing the starting point of philosophical reflection, and second,
as a unifying vision. These two understandings are connected in
the claim that philosophising is intimately connected with
metaphysical thinking.
Introduction
Reason has been subjected to much criticism from various quar-
ters, including philosophy itself. In contrast, the document Fides et Ra-
tio—and more recently, the Lecture by Pope Benedict XVI at
Regensburg—affirms and defends its significance for religious belief.
Strongly supporting the link between faith and reason, the encyclical en-
dorses the tradition of using philosophy, with specific reference to meta-
physics, to express, develop and defend theological doctrines. It also dis-
cusses the importance of metaphysics for one’s philosophical outlook in
life.
In this paper I will offer some observations on the relationship
between the Catholic tradition and philosophy and make some comments
on the suggestions for the future as presented in the encyclical Fides et
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Ratio.1  Then I will provide a response that has been influenced by the
process philosophers, A.N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. I set out
and elaborate what I call ‘philosophy in context’, ‘context’ interpreted in
two distinct but related meanings. ‘Philosophy in context’ first of all means
the concreteness of life as providing the starting point of philosophical
reflection. But ‘philosophy in context’ is also understood as referring to
some kind of a unifying vision or at least the need to recognise its signifi-
cance. These two understandings are connected in the claim that
philosophising is intimately connected with metaphysical thinking.
Support of Philosophy
Given the interest shown in this encyclical in philosophy itself as
well as its recognised importance for theology, one cannot but accept that
such a situation will lead—as indeed it has done so—to promoting philo-
sophical pursuits.2 With any pursuit, no matter in what discipline, the vol-
ume and quality of support, material or otherwise, go a long way towards
advancing it. This advantage is compounded when the pursuit serves a
certain goal—in the case of philosophy, its special service to theology—
because, though secondary, the benefits may be important enough to stimu-
late more interest in the subject.3 Both history and actual results can con-
firm the developments in philosophy which have occurred because of the
Catholic tradition.
But the Catholic Church’s patronage of philosophical research
and the link between philosophy and theology have led some to question
the kind of philosophy that has resulted.4 It might even make one com-
pare the situation to the suspect beneficence of patrons that artists enjoy.
Centuries ago, the Athenian stranger in Plato’s Laws had bemoaned the
practice in Italy and Sicily of leaving the judgment of poets in the hands of
the spectators. Such a practice spelled the destruction of the poets since
they were in the habit of composing their poems to suit the taste of the
judges. Or one may have serious reservations with a philosophy that has
been endorsed by a Church body in the same way that there are those
who frown upon any corporate sponsorships for various activities. The
suspicion is not just about the motives but extends also to the end-prod-
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uct. Similarly, a philosophy that meets with the approval of ecclesiastical
bodies runs the risk of being isolated or largely ignored. Worse, it could
be dismissed as being subservient and therefore lacking in integrity.
The papal document which we are examining has addressed this
criticism. But it is worth adding that the criticism itself seems to be founded
on a certain questionable assumption; namely, that philosophical thinking
occurs or should occur in a vacuum. It does not. The act of philosophising
always takes place in a specific context, and every philosopher brings into
it personal as well as communal presuppositions and assumptions. In ad-
dition, one’s motives as well as intended goals always colour one’s pursuit
of the truth, whether one does this in the religious or non-religious context.
Autonomy is never absolute, nor is freedom of thinking. The encourage-
ment and support of the Catholic Church of philosophy do not in them-
selves constitute restrictions that would prevent it from attaining standards
which would be possible without them. We need to distinguish perception
or isolated cases from the total reality. My point is not to deny that philo-
sophical research has at times become parochial because of the Catholic
Church’s attempt to oversee it, but rather to reject the claim that such
cases constitute a general adverse effect on philosophical thinking.
The criticism is also grounded in another suspect assumption;
namely, that philosophy must be entirely accountable to its own stan-
dards, methods and terms. Hence, any association with faith would be
seen as an unacceptable crossing of boundaries.5 Again, the encyclical
provides a response to this point. But perhaps it is not out of place to note
that in alerting us to the demands of faith on philosophy,6 we are actually
being reminded that human experience in its reality, which includes a cer-
tain awareness of transcendence, is much wider than its conceptual or its
intellectual expression.7 Thus, no philosophical conception can exhaust
experience, simply because its expression is merely one, albeit probably
the most important, feature of the human reality.8 In distancing philosophy
from faith, some philosophers mistake the important conceptual distinc-
tion between reason and faith for the reality of human experience.9 More-
over, this criticism takes a rather narrow interpretation of human rational-
ity to be the exercise of reason whereas the latter arises from, is grounded
in, and serves human rationality. The two are not the same. This means
that philosophy, which employs reason, must be more open to its wider
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base which gives us more access to the truth than what human reason can
achieve.10
In Fides et Ratio John Paul II draws our attention to an important
relevant consideration. He distinguishes between philosophy as a system
and philosophy as human aspiration: “Every philosophical system, while it
should always be respected in its wholeness, without any instrumentalization,
must still recognize the primacy of philosophical enquiry, from which it
stems and which it ought loyally to serve.”11 And he contextualises that
comment by observing the changed role of philosophy itself in modern
culture. “From universal wisdom and learning, it has been gradually re-
duced to one of the many fields of human knowing; indeed in some ways
it has been consigned to a wholly marginal role”12 In other words, it seems
to have forgotten the wider basis.
Faith and Reason
On the issue of the relationship between faith and reason itself, the
encyclical traces and comments on Christianity’s early encounter with
philosophy and shows its acceptance of the positive role of reason in the
development of the Christian faith.13 St. Paul, for instance, entered into
discussion with certain Epicurean and Stoic philosophers. His action was
an acknowledgment that it was possible to have natural knowledge of
God. He also affirmed the belief that the voice of conscience is present in
every human being. The Fathers of the Church on their part regarded the
rational analysis provided by philosophical thinking as helpful in purifying
the concept of divinity.
The Pope points out that to claim that the first Christians were not
interested in philosophical thinking is therefore not true. Admittedly, their
first and foremost concern was the proclamation of the good news. But
they certainly did not ignore the task of deepening the understanding of
faith and its motivations. He cites Justin, for whom Christianity is ‘the only
sure and profitable philosophy’, and Clement of Alexandria who regarded
the Gospel as ‘the true philosophy’ and who turned to Greek philosophy
for the defense of the Christian faith. An even more robust example that he
mentions is St. Augustine. In Augustine’s work one can see the first great
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synthesis of philosophy and theology, which the Pope describes as ‘a
great unity of knowledge, grounded in the thought of the Bible, confirmed
and sustained by a depth of speculative thinking’. Furthermore, in the
Pope’s mind, the ways in which the Fathers engaged with philosophy was
not limited to transposing the truths of faith into philosophical categories.
Rather, their intensity in living the content of their faith led them to the
deepest forms of speculation. Philosophy enabled them to disclose more
completely what was merely implicit and preliminary in their faith. Moving
ahead in time, the Pope then reminds us of Anselm’s concept of intellectus
fidei: faith is to be understood with the help of reason while reason at its
summit acknowledges the significance of faith.
Considerable attention is given to what the Pope describes as
‘the enduring originality of Thomas Aquinas’. In Aquinas there is harmony
of faith and reason. Both are gifts from God, so there can be no contra-
diction between them. Aquinas is said to exemplify the Christian believer
who seeks truth wherever it might be found, thus demonstrating its univer-
sality. Moreover, Aquinas saw how faith itself can enrich reason. He main-
tains that through the work of the Holy Spirit, knowledge matures into
wisdom. This kind of wisdom is higher than philosophical wisdom, which
is based upon the capacity of the intellect to explore reality. It is also
distinct from theological wisdom, which has its source in Revelation and
which explores the content of faith. The wisdom that comes from the Holy
Spirit is explained as presupposing faith but eventually formulating, with
the use of reason, its right judgment on the basis of the truth of faith itself.
On further reflection, however, I find that the interpretation of the
relationship between faith and reason adopted by the encyclical leaves
one with a number of philosophical concerns. Its understanding of faith is
still rather too intellectualised and its interpretation of the function of rea-
son in relation to faith, despite disclaimers and modifications, still gives
reason a rather subservient role. Moreover, one could question the con-
ception of truth that the document takes for granted. The document merges
the understanding of truth set out in Vatican I (truth as eternal and time-
less) with that of Vatican II (the historicity of truth), two understandings
which are not, at first glance, compatible. In addition, any attempt to rec-
oncile two distinct and autonomous realities—and in this context faith and
reason are so regarded—begs the question: what is it that enables us to
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harmonise them, is it faith or is it reason? The document gives faith priority
yet interprets and justifies that status and the attempted reconciliation philo-
sophically.
Another Look at the Relationship between Faith and Reason
In the hope of furthering the discussion of this topic, I would like
to suggest that one could view faith as an awareness of transcendence. It
is an implicit human experience that can be made explicit in various ways.
A religious context is one such way. But it is the exercise of human reason-
ing that enables us to interpret it in a certain way whether religiously or
not. In other words, there is more unity and continuity between faith and
reason despite their respective qualities.
Let me try to develop this suggestion a little further.14 The exercise
of reason within the context of faith is actually a process which involves
the stages of rejection, recognition, re-adjustment and response. By
describing it in this way it is possible to liken our efforts to develop our
faith, which is called for by the encyclical, to the work done by the early
Christians. Furthermore, it means that this task is a continuous challenge
and that the use of reason is not being restricted to the philosophical dis-
cipline.
An early stage in making explicit our experience of transcendence
and in arriving at a satisfactory conceptuality or doctrine is the rejection
of alternatives. To some extent, it may be a matter of being clearer as to
what something is not, rather than of what something is. In the case of the
first Christians who had the important task of formulating Christian doc-
trine which was faithful to what had been experienced by the believing
community, they had to weed out at the same time doctrines which could
not be considered part of the Christian experience. The encyclical notes
that adoption of philosophy by the early Church was cautious. Paul him-
self warned against esoteric speculation, while other writers, especially
Ireneus and Tertullian resisted the temptation to subordinate Revelation to
philosophy.15 Moreover, the early Christians rejected the customary be-
lief in ‘gods’ since ‘god’ was used by the popular religious cults of the day.
When these Christians spoke of their God, they did not want their con-
cept of God to be associated with the gods of popular religion.16 Reject-
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ing something, even within the context of religious faith, does not neces-
sarily mean ‘being negative’. It could, in effect, be a genuine search for
something better. The philosophical questions we ask about our faith, even
if they sometimes lead to rejecting accepted beliefs, could be a healthy
step towards a deeper understanding and appreciation of our faith.
The next stage in this process is that of recognising or becoming
aware of the value of a particular conceptualisation. Here there is partial
acceptance, and some similarities are noted. This stage in the process of
describing God’s reality, for example, reveals the reasons why the early
Church opted in favour of a particular philosophical framework, that of
Stoic philosophy, in its attempts to conceptualise its faith-experience. The
first Christians belonged to the Greco-Roman world and were concerned
to speak to it. They wanted to convey the Christian message to their
neighbours. Greek philosophy was an excellent medium then. Moreover,
they wanted to show the reasonableness of Christianity and the ability of
Christian teachings to withstand a thorough examination by philosophy.
Philosophy, understood as a search for truth, was critical of the mythical
interpretation of reality. There was a parallel, therefore, between the phi-
losophers’ task and that of the first Christians. Both wanted to differenti-
ate their beliefs from those of popular religions which they regarded as
superstitious. The early Christians furthermore found that philosophical
categories helped them understand Christian revelation even more deeply
than had been possible with biblical images. Philosophy met the need to
achieve greater clarification of terms and ideas. Aquinas found much in
Aristotelian philosophy to help him clarify, deepen and defend Christian
beliefs. On this point, however, one could ask whether a different
conceptuality, compared to what the early Church and Aquinas found
helpful, would not be better suited to meet the needs of our faith today. It
is for this reason that I am suggesting that we search for other conceptualities.
Process thought is a good example.
One does not simply take over a favoured formulation. There is
need for the third stage: that of re-adjustment. One has to reshape what
one has recognised as helpful. Thus, there is adaptation prior to adoption,
transformation before acceptance.17 Despite aligning itself with philoso-
phy (thereby rejecting popular religion) the early Church did not com-
106  Prajñâ Vihâra
pletely identify its teachings with those of the philosophers either. For ex-
ample, the philosophers’ God, in spite of its acceptability as the ground of
all being, did not have any religious significance. This God was absolute
perfection and the culmination of one’s intellectual pursuit, but one could
neither pray to nor establish a personal relationship with this God. Thus,
some transformation was called for. But one wonders how satisfactory
the early Church’s transformation of philosophical ideas was, particularly
in its conception of God. One suspects that the present demand for more
relevant and adequate concepts of God harks back to this period in Christian
history.
The fourth stage, that of response, is the acceptance of the trans-
formed conceptuality. It is really a further development. But it should not
be regarded as a final stage if by that is meant that no improvement can be
expected.18 As time goes by, certain intellectual expressions or formula-
tions of our faith can become irrelevant or even misleading. Thus, the
search for newer formulations is in reality an attempt to recover what has
been obscured.19 The dissatisfaction felt by some with the conceptuality
worked out by the early Church has led to calls for more appropriate and
contemporary expressions of the same Christian experience of the faith
and of God.
To recall what had been stated previously, as far as the relation-
ship between faith and reason is concerned,  I would rather refer to it as
“the exercise of reason within the context of religious faith”, because the
starting-point for reflections, whether one is a theist or a secular, is the
common starting-point of any thinking being: our own humanity and our
experience of it as we interact with one another. What distinguishes the
theist is that the use of reason is done within the context of religious faith.
Religious beliefs, therefore, are an acknowledgement of and an articula-
tion of that specific context. It is a context that of course can be chal-
lenged insofar as the theist makes claims. But challenge and dispute by
anyone who does not operate from the same context is possible only
because there is a common starting-point that I have just referred to.
This understanding of the relationship between faith and reason is
thus different from fides quaerens intellectum because in that interpreta-
tion religious faith is already the starting point. Nor should this under-
standing be described as intellectus quaerens fidem because for me it is
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experience rather than an intellectual act that grounds the intellectual pro-
cess. Philosophy thus is not regarded as ancilla fidei, nor are reason and
faith symbolised as the “the two wings” (as are described in the encycli-
cal). Instead I regard the same human experience as occurring in differ-
ent contexts, one of which is described as “religious”. I will explain my
use of “context” a little later.
Future Tasks for Philosophy
The encyclical refers to future tasks for philosophy, thus re-af-
firming its solid support for its continued study and development. Such
support will no doubt stimulate further scholarship and teaching of this
subject. Aside from individual interests in specific issues or school of
thought, the shape of such philosophical research will also be influenced
by the response to official guidance or directives.
John Paul II in Fides et Ratio outlines what he considers to be the
current requirements and tasks for philosophy. Although addressed spe-
cifically to Catholic thinkers, he has a wider audience in mind. The context
in which he presents his suggestions is the acknowledged relationship be-
tween faith and reason, and for this reason he turns to the Christian vision
as expressed in Sacred Scripture. For philosophers, it is probably neither
the source nor even the vision itself but the possibility of having a vision (a
metaphysical as well as an epistemological issue) that will be of interest.
And here John Paul touches on an issue that should indeed concern con-
temporary philosophers—even if it runs counter to much of the work that
is being presently done in philosophy. Noting the fragmentation of knowl-
edge in various fields, including philosophy, and its consequences, one of
which is the crisis of meaning, he speaks of the need for philosophers to
retain and develop a vision of reality.20 He wants us to recover what he
calls “the sapiential dimension” of the pursuit of truth, reminding us that “a
philosophy which no longer asks the meaning of life would be in grave
danger of reducing reason to merely accessory functions, with no real
passion for the search for truth.”21 The encyclical bemoans the loss of
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metaphysical thinking that characterises much of contemporary philoso-
phy, and in doing so illustrates well what had been averted to earlier;
namely, that the Magisterium does more than just point out lacunae but
also sparks off a renewal, and in this case, in the study of metaphysics.
John Paul provides us with the reason:  “If I insist so strongly on the
metaphysical element, it is because I am convinced that it is the path to be
taken in order to move beyond the crisis pervading large sectors of phi-
losophy at the moment, and thus to correct certain mistaken modes of
behaviour now widespread in our society.”22  It is a call worth heeding.23
Another issue touched upon by the encyclical that hopefully will
be pursued by those engaged in philosophical pursuits, is the nature and
status of human reason. According to John Paul II, this is “one of the tasks
which Christian thought will have to take up through the next millennium of
the Christian era.”24  Given the fact that this is the very tool of philoso-
phers, it should be of interest to contemporary philosophy, particularly
since its capabilities have been largely curtailed by—of all people—phi-
losophers themselves.25 Variations of Kant’s criticisms abound in the writ-
ings of many contemporary philosophers. In contrast, the encyclical states
emphatically the conviction that humans can arrive, having been endowed
with reason, at a unified and organic vision of knowledge.26 Since in some
ways the future of philosophy is very much linked to our claims regarding
reason’s capabilities,27 this topic certainly merits much closer attention.
John Paul’s own words on this matter are worth quoting in full:
I appeal to philosophers, and to all teachers of philosophy, ask-
ing them to have the courage to recover, in the flow of an endur-
ingly valid philosophical tradition, the range of authentic wisdom
and truth—metaphysical truth included—which is proper to philo-
sophical enquiry. They should be open to the impelling questions
which arise from the word of God and they should be strong enough
to shape their thought and discussion in response to that challenge.
Let them always strive for truth, alert to the good which truth
contains. Then they will be able to formulate the genuine ethics
which humanity needs so urgently at this particular time. The
Church follows the work of philosophers with interest and appre-
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ciation; and they should rest assured of her respect for the rightful
autonomy of their discipline. I would want especially to encourage
believers working in the philosophical field to illuminate the range
of human activity by the exercise of reason which grows more
penetrating and assured because of the support it receives from
faith.28
Philosophy in Context
As the quotation above shows, Fides et Ratio does not limit itself
to a discussion on the relationship between faith and reason. It undertakes
to set out a certain understanding of philosophy. Drawing from the insights
of process thought, I should now like to provide a further response to the
encyclical regarding its conception of philosophy and of metaphysical think-
ing by pointing to the need to regard philosophy as “in context”.
The detaching of philosophy from its main context—basically,
the concerns of everyday life—can be detrimental. Not only does it devi-
ate from the origins of philosophy, but it loses much of the value of this
truly human act. It can also lead to isolation from other academic disci-
plines, whereas continual dialogue with these can be an advantage not
only to these disciplines but also to philosophy itself. It must be added,
however, that fortunately there have been others who pursue ‘philosophy
in context’. A.N. Whitehead’s description of speculative philosophy as
like the flight of an airplane provides an appropriate imagery: it starts from
the ground, soars up into the rarefied atmosphere and lands back on the
ground.
I need to explain further in what sense I have used the term “con-
text” here since that word is sometimes interpreted differently by other
philosophers, particularly by those influenced by Wittgenstein’s philoso-
phy. What it does not mean is that the act of philosophising is fenced in by
one’s subjective experiences such that one finds it impossible to transcend
them. Rather, I take it to mean—and use the term accordingly—that the
act of philosophising takes place in what process philosophers calls ‘the
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concreteness of life’. These are specific life-situations, but they are not
completely subjective nor are they entirely particular instances, such that
one does not see any resemblance to other situations. The concreteness
of life serves as the starting points for our reflections.
“Context” as used here also refers to some kind of a unifying
vision or at least the need to recognise its significance.29 The specific life-
situations on which the act of philosophising is based serve as pointers
because it is through these specific situations that we become somewhat
aware of a larger picture. In fact, we can only recognise them as specific
because there seems to be a broader background against which they are
set. Whitehead’s analogy of “seeing the wood by means of the trees” can
be helpful here.30 It is the trees that we initially encounter, but it is also they
which enable us to become aware of the wood. In seeing the wood, we
have gone beyond merely noticing the trees. We may even see them in a
different light because we see them against the backdrop of the wood.
Similarly, the larger picture or the vision, that are opened up by the various
contexts in which we philosophise, can enlighten us when we look again at
the specific situations, including those that have set us off initially on our
philosophical pursuits. Or as T.S. Eliot put it: “…we arrive where we
started/And know the place for the first time.”
These two understandings of “context” are connected in the claim
that philosophising is intimately connected with metaphysical thinking. As
a philosophical discipline, metaphysics has been severely criticised by many
contemporary philosophers. I believe, however, that the negativity to-
wards metaphysics is really toward certain metaphysical systems. The
metaphysical spirit which stirred the ancients in their search for true wis-
dom—and which I suspect has not really been abandoned by many of its
critics, including those in the postmodern mode—should direct us towards
a different route in metaphysical thinking, for example, that mapped out
by A.N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.
“Context” is being used then in two distinct but related meanings:
(1) the concreteness of our human experience as the basis for our philo-
sophical reflections; and (2) a unifying vision that underlies our response
to that experience. The question that inevitably arises is how something
concrete (or detailed) can be reconciled with what is essentially abstract
(or general). In insisting that philosophy is always in context, am I there-
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fore claiming that philosophy is at all times both concrete and abstract?
That would be a correct conclusion except that as these terms apply, they
refer to different dimensions of the philosophical act. Insofar as philo-
sophical thinking emerges out of the concreteness of life, it is concrete. It
is based on and grounded in the day-to-day questions—whether it is the
challenge of suffering or what ethical course of action to take—which
need to be addressed as we live our lives and carry on our daily routine.
But philosophical thinking, if it is not to be a superficial or an ad hoc
response, must address those questions against a more general frame-
work that helps to provide a sharper focus. This is the abstract dimension
since it is general and comprehensive. There is something about human
nature that is not fully satisfied with mere instances or selected examples.
It is for this reason that, despite several contemporary criticisms of meta-
physics, I have linked the second meaning of “context” with metaphysical
thinking.
The human desire for some continuity, comprehensiveness, and
unity in our understanding of reality, and in our attempts to make sense of
it, is what I believe drives us to metaphysics. Admittedly, certain meta-
physical developments do not satisfy us. But it is regrettable that in some
quarters, the mention of “metaphysics” is enough to elicit or provoke criti-
cism. In this regard, I agree with H.O. Mounce when he writes that it is
not the word “metaphysics” that is important but what it represents. As he
puts it:
It is to be hoped that we do not see the end of metaphysics in its
traditional sense…. But we can dispense with the word in its mod-
ern usage…. Simply to use it, in its modern sense, is to misrepre-
sent what it purports to classify and simultaneously to enforce the
categories of the post-Kantian or positivist worldview. So by all
means let us see the end of ‘metaphysics’. But let us retain what
it used to mean, for that is simply the activity of philosophy itself.31
I had earlier indicated that philosophy and its close association
with rationality are also in need of some further scrutiny. Rationality, at
least in much of the western tradition, has been understood in almost ex-
clusively intellectual terms. Reasoning and indeed philosophising are
recognised as an exercise of the intellect—with the consequent neglect of
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the other facets of the human act, e.g. the imagination, in our philosophical
pursuits. It is not surprising therefore that philosophy is being studied as
distinct from theology or from literature. I accept that there are good rea-
sons for maintaining and upholding this distinction, but the strict separation
can be quite detrimental. To some extent it has impoverished the develop-
ment of philosophy. It seems to me that this can be traced back to equat-
ing rationality with reason (in the intellectual sense). As Whitehead and
Hartshorne have done in their philosophies, we need in our philosophical
thinking to incorporate the imagination, faith and scientific insights (among
others) in our quest for wisdom.
For only in this way can we truly advance towards the truth.
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and Santiago Sia (eds.), Framing a Vision of the World: Essays in Philosophy,
Science and Religion, Louvain Philosophical Studies 14 (Leuven University
Press, 1999).
23 I discuss this quotation further in “Seeing the Wood by Means of the Trees: a
View on Education and Philosophy,” Process Papers: Proceedings of the Asso-
ciation for Process Philosophy of Education, No. 10 (March 2006).
24 H.O. Mounce, “The End of Metaphysics,” New Blackfriars (September 2005),
527.
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